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Some firms voluntarily make disclosures about the controls and processes in place to ensure the 
reliability of fair value estimates. Consistent with these disclosures being driven by investors’ 
concerns about the reliability of their SFAS 157 estimates, we find that firms with more opaque 
estimates are more likely to provide such disclosures. We then examine whether these 
disclosures improve investors’ perception about the reliability of fair value estimates. We find 
that they are associated with higher market pricing and lower information risk for Level 3 
estimates. Further analyses of the reliability disclosures reveal that the following types of 
information are particularly important to investors: discussion of the external and independent 
pricing of fair value estimates as well as the estimates’ proper classification according to the 
SFAS 157 hierarchy. Overall, our results suggest that the voluntary reliability disclosures that 
firms provide beyond SFAS 157’s three-level estimates help reduce investors’ uncertainty 
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1. Introduction  
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (SFAS 157), Fair Value 
Measurements, became effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years beginning after 
November 15, 2007 and for interim periods within those fiscal years. The most significant 
disclosure requirement under SFAS 157 is the reporting of fair value estimates in accordance 
with a three-level hierarchy based on the nature of the inputs used in the estimation.1 Some 
critics have claimed that SFAS 157 played a role in worsening the financial crisis that erupted in 
2008. Its supporters dispute this, arguing that SFAS 157 merely reflects the problems inherent in 
the underlying values of certain assets and that the objective of the expanded fair value 
disclosure under SFAS 157 is to increase the transparency of fair value estimates. Not 
surprisingly, many studies focus on the fair value estimates presented under the three-level fair 
value hierarchy mandated by SFAS 157, with the intent of drawing conclusions about these 
estimates’ usefulness (e.g., Kolev 2009; Song et al. 2010; Riedl and Serafeim 2011; Magnan et al. 
2014; Goh et al. 2015).  
In this paper, we examine the factors that influence financial firms’ voluntary provision 
of fair value disclosures and some of the disclosures’ economic consequences.  As the degree of 
debate over their usefulness makes evident, there are clearly significant credibility concerns 
about fair value estimates, especially from the perspective of their reliability (e.g., Landsman 
2007; Laux and Leuz 2009; Barth and Landsman 2010). Recent studies also suggest that fair 
value estimates, particularly Level 3 estimates, may not be perceived as reliable by market 
participants, as evidenced by their association with a pricing discount (Song et al. 2010) and 
                                                 
1 Specifically, Level 1 inputs are quoted prices in active markets and hence require no judgment. Level 2 inputs are 
data-adjusted from similar items traded in active markets or from identical or similar items in markets that are not 
active. Level 3 inputs are considered “unobservable” and are based on the models or assumptions of management 
and/or valuation specialists. These inputs are the most subjective and are difficult to verify. 
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higher information and systematic risk (Riedl and Serafeim 2011). These concerns suggest that 
additional fair value disclosures could play an important role in fair value reporting (e.g., Ryan 
2008; Laux and Leuz 2009; Blacconiere et al. 2011; Core 2011).2  
One important disclosure that some firms provide pertains to the controls, processes, and 
procedures designed to ensure fair value estimates’ reliability. For example, Ally Financial Inc. 
offers such a disclosure in the SFAS 157 footnotes of their 10-K report for the year ending 31 
December 2011:  
 We have numerous internal controls in place to ensure the appropriateness of fair value 
measurements. Significant fair value measures are subject to detailed analytics and 
management review and approval. We have an established model validation policy and 
program in place that covers all models used to generate fair value measurements. This 
model validation program ensures a controlled environment is used for the development, 
implementation, and use of the models and change procedures. Further, this program uses 
a risk-based approach to select models to be reviewed and validated by an independent 
internal risk group to ensure the models are consistent with their intended use, the logic 
within the models is reliable, and the inputs and outputs from these models are 
appropriate. Additionally, a wide array of operational controls are in place to ensure the 
fair value measurements are reasonable, including controls over the inputs into and the 
outputs from the fair value measurement models. For example, we backtest the internal 
assumptions used within models against actual performance. We also monitor the market 
for recent trades, market surveys, or other market information that may be used to 
benchmark model inputs or outputs. Certain valuations will also be benchmarked to 
market indices when appropriate and available. We have scheduled model and/or input 
recalibrations that occur on a periodic basis but will recalibrate earlier if significant 
variances are observed as part of the backtesting or benchmarking noted above. 
In Appendix 1, we provide more examples of such disclosures. For brevity, we refer to 
these disclosures as ‘reliability disclosures’. Some anecdotes suggest that financial statements’ 
users find such disclosures useful in mitigating their concerns about the reliability of the fair 
value estimates. For example, Fitch Ratings conducted a review of the annual reports of the 
world's largest banking groups for the year 2007 and find that most of the firms reviewed 
                                                 
2 For example, Ryan (2008) contends that Level 3 fair value estimates that are supported by disclosures of critical 
inputs and the measurements’ sensitivity to these inputs would be more informative to investors. Laux and Leuz 
(2009) state that it would be interesting to study what determines fair value disclosure (or non-disclosure), as well as 
how investors respond to the additional disclosures that firms provide. 
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identified valuation controls as a critical accounting policy. However, they comment that for US 
GAAP filers, the details of specific control processes intended to ensure the accuracy of fair 
value measurements are often scanty; they call for more of this type of disclosure to help 
investors and analysts understand fair value measurements (Fitch Ratings 2008).3 In addition, 
Bischof et al. (2013) examine 2,909 conference calls using a textual analysis and find that 
analysts use conference calls to actively demand greater transparency regarding fair value related 
information, including some questions concerning fair value reclassifications. Finally, some 
studies have suggested that internal control disclosures provide useful information to market 
participants regarding the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Hammersley et al. 2007; Beneish et 
al. 2008).  
To address the above issues, we first investigate the determinants of reliability 
disclosures. We expect firms to face greater demand from investors to provide reliability 
disclosures in order to enhance the credibility of their fair value estimates, especially those that 
are more opaque.4 Consistent with this expectation, we find that only Level 2 and Level 3 
estimates increase the likelihood of reliability disclosures. These results suggest that firms 
provide reliability disclosures when the materiality of more opaque fair value estimates is higher, 
presumably because there is greater demand for such information (Heitzman et al. 2010).  
Second, we examine the economic consequences of these disclosures. Prior literature 
suggests that the voluntary disclosure of supplementary information can increase investors’ 
                                                 
3 In its commentary “FAS 157—Fair Value Disclosures and Litigation Risk”, CRA International emphasizes the 
need for strong internal controls over the management processes that companies use to determine fair value reliably. 
Likewise, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), in its commentary on the IASB’s Discussion 
Paper on Fair Value Measurement, also notes that it is important for appropriate controls to be in place within an 
organization to ensure the consistent treatment and measurement of the fair values disclosed according to the three-
level hierarchy. The commentary is available at http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/ISDA-response-to-IASB-DP-on-
SFAS-157.pdf. 
4 This motivation is consistent with prior studies in the management forecast literature, which show that managers 
provide additional disclosure in response to concerns about the credibility of the primary information (e.g., Hutton et 
al. 2003; Baginski et al. 2004; Lennox and Park 2006; Bagnoli and Watts 2007; Hirst et al. 2007). 
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confidence in the disclosed news (e.g., Brown and Kim 1993; Hutton et al. 2003; Hughes and 
Pae 2004). Hence, we examine whether managers’ discretion in providing reliability disclosures 
improves the fair value estimates’ credibility, especially for the more opaque estimates. Given 
prior findings that Level 3 fair value estimates are associated with a pricing discount (Song et al. 
2010) and a higher information risk (Riedl and Serafeim 2011), we examine whether the 
provision of reliability disclosures improves market pricing and mitigates the information risk of 
these estimates. We find that the provision of reliability disclosures increases market pricing and 
reduces the information risk of Level 3 estimates. These results are robust to several approaches 
that serve to control for the endogeneity of the provision of reliability disclosures, such as 
propensity score matching, the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio in the regression, and the 
exclusion of firms with zero Level 3 fair value assets. In additional analysis, we find some 
evidence that the provision of these reliability disclosures mitigates analysts’ lack of consensus 
about a firm’s earnings with respect to Level 3 estimates. Overall, our results provide consistent 
evidence that reliability disclosures enhance the credibility of more opaque fair value estimates. 
Finally, we conduct more in-depth analyses into the nature of reliability disclosures by 
specifically examining discussions about (1) the external and independent pricing of fair value 
estimates, (2) the proper classification of the estimates according to the SFAS 157 three-level 
hierarchy, and (3) assurances of management’s responsibility in ensuring the reliability of the 
fair value estimates. We find robust evidence that discussions of the external and independent 
pricing of fair value estimates and the proper classification of the estimates according to the 
SFAS 157 three-level hierarchy are important in reducing investors’ uncertainty about Level 3 
estimates. However, we do not find any evidence that disclosures that provide assurance about 
management’s responsibility in ensuring the reliability of fair value estimates reduce investors’ 
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uncertainty about Level 3 estimates. These results strengthen our arguments about reliability 
disclosures’ usefulness in enhancing the credibility of their SFAS 157 fair value estimates, and 
that investors do not simply regard them as boilerplate or “cheap talk” from management. 
Our study makes several contributions. First, we extend the research into SFAS 157, 
which has been subject to intense scrutiny since its introduction. Existing research generally 
focuses on investors’ perception of the usefulness of fair value hierarchy estimates (e.g., Song et 
al. 2010; Riedl and Serafeim 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study 
issues related to voluntary fair value disclosure beyond the SFAS three-level estimates.5 Second, 
we extend the disclosure literature with regard to the usefulness of additional disclosures (e.g., 
Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Dietrich et al. 2001; Verrecchia 2001; Francis et al. 2002; Hutton et 
al. 2003). We document factors unique to the fair value reporting setting that influence managers’ 
decisions to provide additional fair value disclosures. We also provide evidence that voluntary 
reliability disclosures provide assurance to market participants. Our findings thus support the 
move towards expanded fair value disclosure.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our data and measurement of variables. Section 4 presents the main results 
and additional analyses. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Measurement issues related to SFAS 157 fair value estimates 
                                                 
5
 A related paper by Blacconiere et al. (2011) studies the issue of fair value disclosures in the context of managers' 
stock option expenses disclosed under SFAS 123. They find that voluntary disavowals of the reliability of the fair 
value of stock option expenses reflect legitimate reliability concerns, consistent with managers believing that these 
disavowals provide useful information. Unlike Blacconiere et al. (2011), our paper focuses on fair value disclosures 
that potentially enhance, as opposed to refute, the reliability of fair value estimates. Taken together, the two papers 
suggest that voluntary disclosures have a role in enhancing the usefulness of reported fair value estimates. 
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According to the FASB, the expanded fair value information mandated by SFAS 157 
would inform financial statement users about the extent to which fair value is used to measure 
recognized assets and liabilities and the inputs used to develop the measurements. However, a 
major criticism of fair value accounting is whether fair value information is sufficiently reliable 
to be informative to investors and other users of financial statements (Landsman 2007; Ryan 
2008; Barth and Landsman 2010; Song et al. 2010; Riedl and Serafeim 2011; Magnan et al. 2014; 
Goh et al. 2015). For instance, Song et al. (2010) report that the more opaque Level 3 fair value 
estimates disclosed in the SFAS 157 fair value hierarchy are valued less by investors than the 
more transparent Level 1 and 2 fair value estimates. The authors argue that Level 3 fair values 
are less observable and subject to greater information asymmetry between investors and 
management. In addition, Level 3 fair values’ more subjective nature makes them prone to 
greater estimation error. These concerns increase investors’ adverse selection, liquidity risk, and 
information-processing costs, resulting in a greater “discount adjustment effect”. In addition, 
because managers are allowed to exercise a high degree of discretion over Level 3 fair value 
assets, investors may adjust their valuation of Level 3 assets downwards if they are concerned 
about the possible overstatement of Level 3 fair value assets. The authors refer to this effect as a 
“downward cash flow adjustment effect” (p. 1380). Similarly, Riedl and Serafeim (2011) argue 
that fair values based on unobservable (and more subjective) inputs for their estimation will have 
an inherently higher information risk relative to those based on observable (and less subjective) 
inputs. They find that the implied betas for Level 3 financial assets are significantly larger 
relative to those for either Level 1 or 2 financial assets, with implied betas increasing 
monotonically across the Level 1, 2, and 3 categories. 
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Given the concerns about the reliability of more opaque fair value estimates, various 
studies have suggested that there is a role for additional fair value disclosures beyond the 
minimum needed to comply with SFAS 157’s disclosure requirements. For example, Ryan (2008) 
believes that additional disclosures about critical inputs and the measurements’ sensitivity to 
Level 3 inputs would be considerably more informative to investors. Laux and Leuz (2009) 
suggest that it would be interesting to study the determinants, as well as the investor response, to 
the additional fair value disclosures that firms provide, whereas Riedl and Serafeim (2011) 
conjecture that firms that provide high quality SFAS 157 related disclosures may be able to 
mitigate the information gap across the Level 1, 2, and 3 measurements. Further, Magnan et al. 
(2014) suggest that granular disclosure about the measurement basis for reported assets and 
liabilities help investors make sense of the reported numbers. In this study, we examine the 
determinants and economic consequences of a type of fair value disclosure that some firms 
voluntarily provide in the SFAS 157 footnotes—disclosures that discuss the controls, processes, 
and procedures in place to ensure the fair value estimates’ reliability (i.e., reliability disclosures).   
 
2.2 Determinants of voluntary reliability disclosures in SFAS 157 
Healy and Palepu (2001) note that information asymmetry problems between the firm 
and outside investors prevent the efficient allocation of resources in a capital market economy. 
As such, corporate disclosures play an important role in mitigating these problems, which 
improves the functioning of the capital market. For instance, when a firm seeks to raise capital 
through either public debt or equity, managers have more information about the firm’s future 
prospects than do outside investors. The cost of public debt or equity could be significant if this 
information asymmetry problem is not resolved (Myers and Majluf 1984). Hence, managers have 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosure to reduce the information asymmetry problem, thereby 
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reducing the cost of external financing. Consistent with this line of reasoning, prior literature 
documents that firms provide voluntary disclosures to avoid the discounting of firm value that 
results from information asymmetries (Akerlof 1970; Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981).  
In the context of SFAS 157, we expect investors’ concerns about the reliability of the 
more opaque fair value estimates to serve as an incentive for firms to issue more voluntary 
reliability disclosures. During the financial crisis in 2008, financial sector firms were adversely 
affected by the trading illiquidity of some of their assets. Consequently, they lobbied for more 
flexibility in valuing their assets based on the assets’ underlying fundamentals or expected future 
cash flows (e.g., American Bankers Association 2008; Mortgage Bankers Association 2008; US 
Bancorp 2008). In the process, some firms reclassified a portion of their assets as Level 3 assets. 
However, Level 3 fair value estimates are subject to greater discounting by investors and higher 
information risk because they are inherently more difficult to estimate and the estimation is 
susceptible to greater managerial discretion (Song et al. 2010; Riedl and Serafeim 2011).  
Managers may feel more compelled to provide disclosures pertaining to the more opaque fair 
value estimates to avoid these estimates being discounted. The demand for more fair value 
accounting transparency can be seen in various comments by regulators, scholars, and financial 
statement users (Ryan 2008; Laux and Leuz 2009). In fact, a key reason behind the calls to 
suspend or eliminate SFAS 157 during the recent financial crisis was that deteriorating market 
conditions increased the opacity of the disclosed fair value estimates, particularly Level 3 
estimates. This opacity led to uncertainty as to whether these estimates reflected fundamentals 
(Laux and Leuz 2010). Furthermore, the lack of transparency relating to more opaque estimates 
might lead users to believe that managers are withholding unfavorable information (Kothari et al. 
2009; Hollander et al. 2010). Hence, we expect firms to voluntarily provide disclosures to 
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assuage investors’ concerns about the reliability of more opaque fair value estimates.  Our first 
hypothesis, in alternative form, is:6 
H1:  Firms with more opaque fair value estimates are more likely to provide reliability 
disclosures.  
Notwithstanding the above arguments, there are a few reasons why firms may not provide 
reliability disclosures. First, some managers might not be aware of the benefits and costs of 
providing such information. Even if firms have this awareness, there would still be substantial 
uncertainty about the extent of disclosure, especially since SFAS 157 is a relatively new standard. 
To illustrate this point, as noted earlier, the accounting standards involving fair value accounting 
have been evolving, especially with regard to the amount of mandated disclosure. Second, with 
regard to disclosures about reliability controls, if a firm lacks such controls, managers cannot 
disclose their presence without potentially facing the penalties of misrepresentation. Third, 
managers might also face the threat of litigation risk and the leakage of proprietary information. 
For these reasons, we may not find results consistent with H1.  
 
2.3 Economic consequences of reliability disclosures  
Our second research question deals with whether reliability disclosures enhance the 
reliability of the fair value measurements, particularly the more opaque ones. Economic theory 
predicts that a firm’s disclosure to investors can reduce information asymmetry between the firm 
and its investors. Hence, when a firm is more transparent to its investors, investors’ uncertainty 
about the firm’s value is reduced (Verrecchia 2001). Verrecchia (2001) provides a simple model 
showing that investors’ responses to news increase when the uncertainty underlying the 
                                                 
6 This paper extends Song et al. (2010) and Riedl and Serafeim (2011), who find that mark-to-model estimates – 
Level 2 and Level 3 estimates – are viewed by the market as more opaque. For that reason and for ease of exposition, 
we collectively classify these estimates as being more opaque. 
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disclosure is lower. Motivated by the notion that the voluntary disclosure of supplementary 
information can increase investors’ confidence in the disclosed news, Hughes and Pae (2004) 
model the managerial incentives to provide such voluntary disclosure and show that a firm 
discloses high precision supplementary information to enhance confidence in its estimates. 
Empirically, prior papers have investigated the role of voluntary supplementary disclosure in 
investors’ pricing of the main disclosure. For example, Brown and Kim (1993) find that for small 
firms, the market reaction to earnings news that is accompanied by a non-earnings disclosure is 
significantly more favorable than is the reaction to unaccompanied earnings news, unconditional 
on the direction of the news. In addition, other studies have shown that additional disclosures can 
bolster the credibility of less reliable information (e.g., Bryan 1997; Francis et al. 2002; Hutton 
et al. 2003; Baginski et al. 2004; Lennox and Park 2006; Bagnoli and Watts 2007).7  
Given the guidance from prior literature on the role of supplementary information in 
reducing uncertainty (or increasing credibility), we argue that voluntary reliability disclosures 
can reduce the uncertainty associated with more opaque fair value estimates. Because Level 3 
fair values are subject to greater estimation errors, investors are likely to be concerned with 
whether the firm has sufficient controls and processes in place to ensure the fair value estimates’ 
reliability. The primary reporting source of the uncertainty faced by investors concerns 
management intent when reporting fair value measurements that involve significant managerial 
judgement. Prior research has shown that market participants view fair value accounting 
measurement as an opportunity for managers either to exploit their discretion to produce biased 
numbers or to provide a more informative signal (Barth et al. 1998; Bushman and Landsman 
                                                 
7 For example, Bryan (1997) examines whether the narrative disclosures in the Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) section of 10-K reports are useful to investors, whereas Francis et al. (2002) examine whether 
price reactions to earnings releases are related to changes in the additional information disclosed in these earnings 
releases. Hutton et al. (2003) examine the impact of supplementary statements on the informativeness of 
management earnings forecasts. 
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2010; Magnan et al. 2014). Given that the economic consequences of fair value disclosure might 
not be monotonic across the three levels of fair value estimates, the pattern of the economic 
consequences of these disclosures is thus an empirical question.  
Prior studies have shown that effective internal controls reduce estimate errors in the 
financial reporting process (Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) and investors 
consider disclosures of internal control effectiveness to be a source of information on the 
reliability of financial reports (Hammersley et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008).8 Reidl and Serafeim 
(2011) also suggest that firms with higher quality disclosures, both in general and specific to 
SFAS 157, will mitigate any information gap across the Level 1, 2, and 3 fair value designations. 
Using the overall information environment (i.e., analyst following, forecast error, forecast 
dispersion, and market capitalization) to proxy for the informativeness of SFAS 157 related 
disclosures, they find that that firms with ex ante higher quality information environments better 
mitigate differences in information risk across the fair value designations. To the extent that 
investors perceive reliability disclosures as credible evidence that the firm has adequate controls 
and procedures in place to ensure the reasonableness of its fair value estimates, we expect such 
disclosures to mitigate the information asymmetry problems and higher information risk 
associated with Level 3 fair value estimates, as documented in Song et al. (2010) and Riedl and 
Serafeim (2011), respectively. We state our second hypothesis in alternative form as follows: 
H2: The lower market pricing and higher information risk of more opaque fair value 
estimates are mitigated when a firm provides reliability disclosures. 
To better understand how reliability disclosures reduce investors’ uncertainty, we probe 
more deeply into their contents to explore the particular disclosure mechanisms that are likely to 
                                                 
8 In contrast, Whisenant et al. (2003) find that disclosures of control deficiencies have no negative stock price 
reaction and Ogneva et al. (2007) find no significant association between internal control weakness disclosures and 
the cost of equity capital. 
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have the intended effect on market pricing and the information risk associated with more opaque 
fair value estimates. First, as mentioned earlier, managers can exercise more discretion in 
determining Level 3 fair values compared to the fair values for Level 1 and 2 assets. We 
conjecture that disclosures about how the firm obtains external and independent pricing in fair 
value estimates can help reduce investors’ concern that managers exercise discretion and 
intentionally introduce biases in their estimations of Level 3 fair values.9 In support of this notion, 
prior studies have shown that the use (or disclosure) of external appraisals is important in its 
effect on how the market perceives the valuation of long-lived tangible assets (Dietrich et al. 
2001; Muller and Riedl 2002).10 Our first sub-hypothesis, in alternative form, is: 
H2a: The lower market pricing and higher information risk of more opaque fair value 
estimates are mitigated when a firm provides a discussion of how it obtains external and 
independent pricing of its fair value estimates. 
An important feature of SFAS 157 is the requirement that the firm discloses fair value 
measurements based on the fair value hierarchy. Reliability concerns arising from the opacity of 
fair value estimates can be exacerbated if investors believe that management’s classification or 
reclassification of fair value items is motivated by the intention to opportunistically produce 
                                                 
9 Consider the example of Navigators Group in Appendix 1. In their reliability disclosures, the company discloses 
that any pricing where the input is based solely on a broker price is deemed a Level 3 price. More importantly, the 
company discloses that “all prices for its fixed maturities, short-term investments and equity securities valued as 
Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3, are received from independent pricing services utilized by one of our outside investment 
managers whom we employ to assist us with investment accounting services. This manager utilizes a pricing 
committee which approves the use of one or more independent pricing service vendors.” Note that our definition of 
“external and independent pricing” includes only pricing that is obtained from outside the firm, but not pricing 
obtained from internal risk departments that are separate from trading activities.  
10 Specifically, Muller and Riedl (2002) examine a sample of UK investment property firms and find that market 
makers perceive information asymmetry across traders to be lower for firms employing external appraisers than 
those employing internal appraisers. Dietrich et al. (2001) also provide evidence that external property appraisals are 




biased fair value estimates (Laux and Leuz, 2009).11 For example, one possible concern is that 
firms might attempt to use the discretion underlying the valuation of Level 3 assets to produce 
biased estimates. This concern is the key reason that SFAS 157 requires firms to disclose 
changes in Level 3 items, including gains or losses on Level 3 items and transfers between Level 
3 and other levels. Bischof et al. (2013) find that analysts use conference calls to actively 
demand greater transparency regarding fair value related information, including some questions 
relating to fair value reclassifications. They also find that the likelihood of a conference call 
question about fair value reclassifications is negatively associated with the extent of explanatory 
footnote disclosures in simultaneously published financial reports. Consequently, reliability 
disclosures that discuss the controls and procedures established to ensure proper classification of 
the estimates according to the SFAS 157 three-level hierarchy can alleviate investors’ concern 
that management overstates Level 3 estimates.12 Our second sub-hypothesis, in alternative form, 
is: 
H2b: The lower market pricing and higher information risk of more opaque fair value 
estimates are mitigated when a firm provides a discussion about the proper classification of the 
estimates according to the SFAS 157 hierarchy. 
Finally, reliability disclosures also allow firms to assure investors about management’s 
responsibility in the fair value estimation process and in ensuring the reliability of the fair value 
estimates. For instance, Ace Ltd. disclosed in its SFAS 157 footnotes (see Appendix 1) that 
“while we obtain values for the majority of the investment securities we hold from one or more 
pricing services, it is ultimately management’s responsibility to determine whether the values 
                                                 
11 For the literature that examines how firms engage in opportunistic classification to obtain the desired accounting 
outcomes, see Godwin et al. (1998), Hirst and Hopkins (1998), and Dechow et al. (2010).  
12 The example of Newalliance Bancshares Inc. in Appendix 1 notes that “management assessed the valuation 
techniques used by IDC based on a review of their pricing methodology to ensure proper hierarchy classifications.”  
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obtained and recorded in the financial statements are representative of fair value.” Prior studies 
suggest that management certification of financial statements influences users’ perception of the 
financial reports. For example, Chang et al. (2006) find that CEOs’ and CFOs’ certification of 
financial statements under oath, pursuant to the administrative order issued by the SEC on June 
27, 2002, provides assurance to investors by making the disclosure more credible and by 
reducing the information asymmetry between owners and management.13 To the extent that such 
“assurance” disclosures are credible to investors and alleviate their concerns about estimation 
errors or biases, we expect the downward discount adjustment effect and the information risk 
associated with Level 3 fair values to be mitigated. Our third sub-hypothesis, in alternative form, 
is:14  
H2c: The lower market pricing and higher information risk of more opaque fair value 
estimates are mitigated when a firm provides a discussion of their assurances of management’s 
responsibility for the fair value estimates’ reliability.    
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Measuring voluntary fair value reliability disclosures 
We started from a sample of banks and insurance companies with available information 
on Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets in Compustat for the period from 2008 to 2011. 
We then utilize the financial statement footnotes in each firm’s Form 10-K filings to determine 
the presence of disclosures relating to the controls, processes, and procedures in place to ensure 
the reliability of the SFAS 157 fair value estimates. Because firms also provide mandatory fair 
                                                 
13 Furthermore, Blacconiere et al. (2011) find that voluntary disavowals about the reliability of fair value of stock 
option expenses disclosed under SFAS 123 reflect legitimate reliability concerns, consistent with managers 
believing that these disavowals provide useful information. 
14 In this paper, we view managers as voluntarily affirming the reliability of their reported fair value estimates and 
the fair value measurement processes. To the extent that these assurance disclosures overlap with mandatory 
disclosures under other requirements (e.g., CEO/CFO responsibility for financial statements under Sarbanes Oxley 
Section 302), this effect should work against our finding significant results for this test. 
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value disclosures as required under SFAS 157, we exercise additional caution to ensure that 
these mandatory disclosures are excluded from our reliability disclosures. Specifically, we 
carefully read the disclosure requirements provided by FASB 
(http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS157.pdf), which are in paragraph 32(a)–(d) and paragraph 
33(a) and (b). FASB mainly requires disclosure about the three-level hierarchy information, the 
valuation techniques, and gains and losses from the fair value changes in Level 3 assets and 
liabilities. It does not require any disclosure about the controls or procedures in place to ensure 
the reliability of fair value estimates, indicating that reliability disclosures are voluntary in 
nature.15  In Appendix 1, we provide some examples of these reliability disclosures, as found in 
the SFAS 157 footnote.16  
We observe significant cross-sectional variation in the extent of these voluntary 
reliability disclosures. Specifically, 19.6% of our firm-year observations have reliability 
disclosures and the word length of these disclosures ranges from 19 to 1,661 words. The contents 
of the reliability disclosures include a discussion of how the firm obtains external and 
independent pricing of the fair value estimates, the estimates’ proper classification according to 
the SFAS 157 three-level hierarchy, and assertions by management about their responsibility in 
reviewing or verifying the fair values for reliable representation. For brevity and ease of 
                                                 
15 The FASB issued two additional updates during our sample period. The first update, ASU 2010-06, provides 
further clarification about disclosures relating to transfers in and out of Level 1 and 2 items as well as the 
reconciliation of Level 3 measurements during the year. The second update, ASU 2011-04, requires firms to provide 
more information relating to the valuation processes and the sensitivity analysis of the Level 3 measurements. 
However, neither of these updates requires firms to disclose information relating to the procedures in place to ensure 
the reliability of the SFAS 157 fair value estimates.       
16 To identify reliability disclosures, we asked two research assistants to read the SFAS 157 footnote disclosure for 
each of these companies. The authors then read the reliability disclosures and verified that their identification was 




exposition, we present our results using FV_VolDiscl, which is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm has provided voluntary reliability disclosure, and zero otherwise.17   
 
3.2 Determinants of reliability disclosures (Hypothesis 1) 
We use the following model to examine whether the levels of fair value estimates as 
disclosed under SFAS 157 are associated with the presence of reliability disclosures: 
FV_VolDiscl = a1 + a2 FVA1 + a3 FVA2 + a4 FVA3 + a5 FVL + ∑j aj Controls + εit.    (1)  
 
FV_VolDiscl is as previously defined. FVA1, FVA2, and FVA3 are the amounts of Level 
1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets, respectively, scaled by total assets. FVL is the amount 
of the fair value liabilities scaled by total assets. 
We also include other factors that might influence the presence of reliability disclosures 
(Controls). Early Adoption is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts SFAS 157 
early, and zero otherwise. 10-K Words is the total number of words in the Form 10-K filings. 
Big4 Auditor is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, zero 
otherwise. Segment is the number of business segments in which the firm operates. Log Market 
Cap is the natural log of market value of equity. Inst Hold is the percentage of outstanding shares 
held by institutional investors. Coverage is the number of analysts covering the firm in the month 
before the month of the filing date. We hypothesize that when a firm is subject to greater 
monitoring by external stakeholders (e.g., institutional shareholders, auditors, and analysts), the 
firm has a greater incentive to disclose more information regarding its fair value measurements. 
Thus, we expect Inst Hold, Big 4 Auditor, and Coverage to be positively associated with our 
                                                 
17 We choose FV_VolDiscl as our main disclosure variable because it is more objectively constructed and has 
possibly less noise. Furthermore, in this paper, we study many different outcomes and conduct several cross-
sectional analyses. Nonetheless, when we use the total number of words in the reliability disclosures as an 
alternative measure, we obtain similar results. We report those results in Table 7. 
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reliability disclosure measure. The managers of firms facing higher litigation risk may be more 
careful in providing reliability disclosures. Hence, we control for litigation risk (Litigation) using 
an ex-post measure based on Rogers and Stocken (2005). We also include firm age (Age) to 
proxy for managers’ sophistication in dealing with disclosure regulation and understanding the 
information demand from investors. In addition, we control for whether the firm has issued a 
management forecast in the prior year (Mgt Forecast) to proxy for proprietary costs and the 
propensity to provide voluntary disclosure. We control for Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q) because a firm 
may have an incentive to provide more information if the market valuation of its assets is 
relatively low. Finally, we include return on assets (ROA), an indicator variable for negative 
income before extraordinary items (Loss), and leverage (Leverage). When a firm is performing 
poorly or is highly levered, investors might be more uncertain about the reliability of the fair 
value estimates due to a concern about managerial incentives to bias the estimates, especially if 
the fair value estimates are material. To alleviate such uncertainty, the firm might provide some 
assurance about the reliability of the estimates via reliability disclosures.   
 
3.3 Economic consequences of reliability disclosures 
For the test of Hypothesis 2, we first examine the pricing effect of the reliability 
disclosures by extending the model used in Song et al. (2010): 
Share price = b1 + b2 FVA1
 s
 + b3 FVA2
 s
 + b4 FVA3
 s
 + b5 FV_VolDiscl  
 + b6 FVA1
s
 × FV_VolDiscl + b7FVA2
 s
 × FV_VolDiscl + b8FVA3
 s× FV_VolDiscl  
 + b9 NFVA
 s
  + b10 NFVL
 s + b11 FVL
 s
  + b12 Net Income  + εit.      (2) 
 
Share price is the 10-K filing month-end price per share. FVA1 s, FVA2 s, FVA3 s, and 
FVL s, are the Level 1, 2, and 3 assets and the fair value liabilities per share, respectively. 
Following Song et al. (2010) and in keeping with the conventions of the value relevance 
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literature, we use number of shares instead of total assets as the scalar. NFVA s and NFVL s are the 
non-fair value assets and liabilities per share. Net Income is the income before extraordinary 
items per share. FV_VolDiscl is defined earlier. Our variables of interest in this regression model 
are the coefficients on the interaction terms, particularly the coefficients on FVA2 s x 
FV_VolDiscl and FVA3 s x FV_VolDiscl. Song et al. (2010) find that the market pricing of Level 
1 fair value assets is greater than it is for Level 2 and 3 assets, suggesting greater information 
asymmetry problems with Level 2 and 3 assets. If reliability disclosures reduce the information 
risk associated with Level 3 assets, we expect the coefficients on FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl and 
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl to be positive.18 
Next, Riedl and Serafeim (2011) show that a firm’s risk is expected to increase across the 
fair value assets classified as Level 1, 2 and 3 measurements because more subjective inputs are 
progressively being used to derive the fair value estimation across the fair value designations. 
We extend their model to examine the effect of reliability disclosures on the information risk 
associated with the reported fair values estimates:  
Info Risk = c1 + c2 FVA1 + c3 FVA2 + c4 FVA3 + c5 FV_VolDiscl + c6 FVA1× FV_VolDiscl  
 + c7 FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl + c8 FVA3× FV_VolDiscl  
 + c9 NFVA + c10 Leverage + εit.       (3) 
 
                                                 
18 Price is a complicated construct that reflects expected future cash flows and discount rate. We assume that the 
firm is making a reliability disclosure only if it indeed implemented the disclosed action to increase reliability. 
Hence, an investor reading the disclosure could infer effects on both expected cash flows and discount rate. For 
example, the use of external pricing services could be costly and suggest complexities (e.g., higher risk) in the 
underlying assets such that fair valuation cannot be done internally. This, in turn, could lower the price. That said, 
reliability disclosures can also reduce information risk and, to the extent that the reduction in information risk 
reduces the discount rate, the price will be increased. Hence, there is tension as to the main effect. We focus on the 
interaction effect because our focus is on how reliability disclosures enhance investors’ confidence in the relatively 
more opaque fair value estimates. The idea here is that while reliability disclosures may be costly, they may also 
have the additional effect of enhancing the credibility in other disclosures.   
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Info Risk is either Beta_adj or Correl_adj. Beta_adj is the firm’s equity beta from a 
single market factor model adjusted by its equity ratio, defined as the ratio of the firm’s 
shareholder’s equity to total assets. Lambert et al. (2007) theoretically show that quality 
disclosure can lower a firm’s equity beta. Relying on this theory, the authors use the equity beta 
as an information risk proxy.19 Correl_adj is the alternative proxy for the information risk used 
by Riedl and Serafeim (2011) and is obtained by adjusting the correlation between the market- 
and firm-specific returns (𝜌𝑖,𝑚) by the firm’s equity ratio.
20 Both variables are measured in the 
period from the month following the last fiscal year's filing month to the current year's filing 
month. All the other variables are defined in Equation (1) and Appendix 2. Our variables of 
interest in Equation (3) are FVA2× FV_VolDiscl and FVA3× FV_VolDiscl. We expect negative 
coefficients on both interaction variables, suggesting that reliability disclosures lower the 
information risk in Level 2 and 3 estimates.  In all our regressions, we use two-way clustered 
robust standard errors to control for within-firm and within-year correlations (Rogers 1993; 
Petersen 2009). We also include industry fixed effects to control for different business models 
across different types of firms.  
The decision to provide reliability disclosures is endogenous and this can introduce errors 
in the estimation of Equations (2) and (3). We conduct several alternative regression 
specifications to address this concern. First, we create a matched sample based on propensity 
score matching (LaLonde 1986). This method creates a non-reliability disclosure control sample 
with the same predicted probabilities of providing reliability disclosures (i.e., it considers all 
                                                 
19 However, they note that the “equity beta is the weighted-average beta across a firm’s asset and liability structure.” 
They therefore estimate the asset-specific implied beta, which is “Beta_adj.” 
20 Prior literature on stock return synchronicity suggests that the co-movement between market returns and firm-
specific returns captures the firm’s information risk (Morck et al. 2000; Durnev et al. 2003; Jin and Myers 2006). 
The rationale is that among firms with less firm-specific information, firm values are more affected by macro-
economic factors, resulting in a higher correlation between the firm’s stock price movement and that of the market.   
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predictive variables together to estimate the same propensity of providing reliability disclosures). 
We then re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) using this matched sample. Second, we employ the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate a probit regression of the 
likelihood of providing reliability disclosures (i.e., Equation 1). We then calculate the inverse 
Mills ratio from this regression and include it in Equations (2) and (3). Finally, to ensure that our 
results are not driven by firms with no exposure to Level 3 assets (that is, firms that are also less 
likely to have a need to provide reliability disclosures), we repeat our analyses after excluding 
firms with zero Level 3 fair value assets. 
 
3.4 Sample selection 
We obtain financial variables, filing dates, sample firms’ auditors, and the number of 
segments from Compustat; share prices and returns from CRSP; institutional ownership data 
from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database; and the number of analysts following 
the firm from I/B/E/S. We hand-collect our main variable of interest, FV_VolDiscl, based on a 
sample of banks and insurance companies with available information on Level 1, Level 2, or 
Level 3 fair value assets in the Compustat database.21 Since some firms started reporting their 
fair value hierarchy information in 2007, our sample firms’ fiscal periods span from November 
2007 to December 2011. We focus on banks and insurance companies because financial firms 
are most likely to be affected by SFAS 157 and they hold relatively more Level 2 and Level 3 
assets than do firms in other industries. Specifically, we note that 69% of banks and insurance 
companies hold Level 2 assets (banks: 68.9%, insurance companies: 69.4%) and 42% of banks 
and insurance companies hold Level 3 assets (banks: 37.2%, insurance companies: 59.9%). In 
                                                 




contrast, only 30.4% of firms in other industries report non-zero Level 2 assets, whereas only 
13.7% of firms in other industries report non-zero Level 3 assets.  
Based on the above requirements, we obtain an initial sample of 2,509 firm-year 
observations. We also require these firms to have ordinary shares (CRSP share code 10 and 11), 
which results in 2,383 firm-years. After deleting observations with missing or unavailable 10-K 
reports, our final sample has 2,265 firm-year observations representing 681 distinct firms—555 
banks and 126 insurance companies. In running each regression, our sample decreases further 
because of missing values and the deletion of outliers. For outlier deletion, we follow Song et al. 
(2010) and remove observations in which the studentized regression residuals are greater than 
two.22  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression to examine 
the factors influencing reliability disclosures. The mean value of FV_VolDiscl is 0.196, implying 
that about 20 percent of the sample observations have reliability disclosures. The proportion of 
Level 1 (Level 2, Level 3) assets to total assets is 0.029 (0.217, 0.017), whereas the proportion of 
non-fair value assets to total assets is 0.741 for our sample firms. The proportion of fair value 
liabilities to total assets is 0.007. Hence, the sample firms have a greater amount of Level 2 
assets, compared to Level 1 and 3 assets, and a much larger proportion of fair value assets 
compared to fair value liabilities. The relative amounts of Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 items are 
consistent with the literature (e.g., Song et al. 2010; Riedl and Serafeim 2011).  
                                                 
22 The sample size in the baseline regression is slightly different from those in the regressions with the interaction 
variables. This is because the studentized residuals are computed after running the regressions and the number of 
observations in which the studentized residuals are greater than two changes after each regression is run.     
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With respect to the other variables, early adopters account for 3.9 percent of our sample. 
The average firm in our sample is relatively large. The mean market value is $2.8 billion. In 
terms of profitability, the mean net income per share and ROA is $0.241 and 0.002, respectively. 
The mean leverage is 0.855, as our sample firms are financial firms. 38.1 percent of our sample 
firms’ shares, on average, are held by institutional investors, whereas the mean number of 
analysts following our sample firms is 4.165. 46.3 percent of our sample is audited by a Big 4 
auditor. The average word count for the Form 10-K filings in our sample is 60,139 words. The 
sample firms have an average firm age of 16.3 years and approximately ten percent of the firm-
years have at least one management forecast issued in the prior year. 
 
4.2 Determinants of reliability disclosures (Hypothesis 1) 
Table 2 reports the results examining the determinants of reliability disclosures. Panel A 
presents the means and medians of the fair value estimates and firm characteristics for firms with 
and without reliability disclosures. All three-level fair value estimates are significantly higher for 
firms with reliability disclosures relative to those without them. These univariate results are 
consistent with firms providing more reliability disclosures when they have higher fair value 
estimates. The differences in other firm characteristics between firms with and without reliability 
disclosures are mostly significant, suggesting that controlling for these firm characteristics is 
important in our multivariate analyses.  
Panel B presents the probit regression results on the determinants of reliability 
disclosures (i.e., Equation 1).  We first present the results for the full sample in Column 1. We 
find that the coefficients on FVA2 and FVA3 are 0.803 (t=2.36) and 2.097 (t=3.12), respectively, 
whereas the coefficient on FVA1 is 0.098 (t=0.15).  Hence, firms with greater amounts of Level 2 
and 3 assets, but not Level 1 assets, are more likely to provide voluntary reliability disclosures. In 
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terms of economic significance, for a one standard deviation change in FVA2, the probability of 
providing reliability disclosures increases by 2.9 percent (0.156 × 0.185). For a one standard 
deviation change in FVA3, the probability increases by 3.3 percent (0.398 × 0.083). 
The coefficients on Log Market Cap and Leverage are positive and significant (0.192, 
t=2.85, and 2.334, t=3.33, respectively), which suggests that larger and more leveraged firms are 
more likely to provide reliability disclosures. We also find that greater external monitoring by 
institutional investors or auditors induces managers to provide these reliability disclosures. 
Specifically, the coefficient on Inst Hold is 0.005 (t=2.00) and the coefficient on Big4 Auditor is 
0.451 (t=2.52). The total word disclosures in the Form 10-K filings (10-K Words) is positively 
associated with FV_VolDiscl (0.007, t=2.34), implying that firms that provide more Form 10-K 
disclosures are also more likely to provide these reliability disclosures. The negative coefficient 
on Tobin’s Q (-3.262, t=-3.92) suggests that firms that have fewer valuation concerns, i.e., firms 
with a higher Tobin’s Q, are less likely to provide reliability disclosures. Finally, we find mixed 
weak evidence on how firm performance affects the provision of reliability disclosures, with the 
coefficient on Loss being 0.158 (t=1.71) and that on ROA being 2.703 (t=1.70).  
 As shown in Table 1, a significant portion of our sample does not have Level 3 assets.23 
To ensure that our earlier results are not driven by firms with limited economic exposure to 
Level 3 assets, we re-estimate Equation 1 after excluding firm-years with zero Level 3 fair value 
assets; we present the results in Column 2. We continue to find that the coefficients on FVA2 and 
FVA3 are positive and statistically significant. Overall, our results in Table 2 provide evidence 
that firms are more likely to provide reliability disclosures when they have relatively more 
opaque fair value items that are estimated based on Level 2 and 3 valuation inputs. As asset 
                                                 
23 Although the median of FVA3 is tabulated as 0.000, consistent with the median of FVA3 s (0.056), the median is 
not zero. The actual median value is 0.00045. In our sample, approximately 57 percent of the observations have non-
zero Level 3 assets.  
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opacity results in increased demand for more disclosures, it provides incentives for managers to 
be more transparent and to supply more reliability disclosures so as to increase investor 
confidence in these estimates. 
 
4.3 Economic consequences of reliability disclosures (Hypothesis 2) 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the effect of reliability disclosures on the 
market pricing of the three-level fair value assets. We first report the baseline regression results 
without the effect of reliability disclosures in Column 1. Consistent with Song et al. (2010), the 
pricing coefficients for FVA1 s (0.916, t=25.00), FVA2 s (0.828, t=18.19), and FVA3 s (0.826, 
t=16.45) are all positive and significant, and the magnitude decreases from FVA1 s to FVA3 s as 
investors’ concern about the reliability of the fair value estimates increases. Column 2 presents 
the results when we interact our reliability disclosure measure (FV_VolDiscl) with FVA1s, 
FVA2s, and FVA3 s. The positive and significant coefficient on FVA3 s × FV_VolDiscl (0.133, 
t=2.23) indicates that the provision of reliability disclosures in the Form 10-K filings is 
positively associated with a higher market pricing for Level 3 assets, presumably because Level 
3 assets are subject to greater information asymmetry problems, and reliability disclosures are 
able to mitigate some of the information risk associated with these fair value assets. The 
coefficients on FVA1 s × FV_VolDiscl and FVA2s × FV_VolDiscl are statistically insignificant. 
We interpret our results as implying that the provision of reliability disclosures has the greatest 
impact on the valuation of Level 3 assets. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on 
FVA3 s × FV_VolDiscl indicates that the pricing for Level 3 estimates improves by $0.133 per 
dollar of Level 3 estimates for firms that provide reliability disclosures versus those that do not.  
While our hypothesis focuses on the effects of reliability disclosure on the pricing of the 
more opaque Level 2 and 3 mark-to-model assets, it is also interesting to examine whether 
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reliability disclosures have a greater effect on these assets than they do on Level 1 mark-to-
market assets. To study this, we use the F-tests of contrasts (Kmenta 1996; Craighead et al. 
2004). Specifically, we determine if the sum of the coefficients on FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl and 
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl is greater than the coefficient on FVA1 × FV_VolDiscl. We find that the 
difference is significant at the 5 percent level (F = 3.25, p < 0.036), implying that reliability 
disclosure has a greater effect on enhancing the pricing of market-to-model assets than mark-to-
market assets. 
Columns 3, 4, and 5 present robustness analyses after using propensity score matching, 
including the inverse Mills ratio, and excluding firms with zero Level 3 fair value assets. 24 With 
the exception of the regression specification that includes the inverse Mills ratio, the coefficient 
on FVA3 s × FV_VolDiscl remains positive and significant. In contrast, the coefficients on FVA1 s 
× FV_VolDiscl and FVA2 s × FV_VolDiscl are significant only in Column 3. Overall, the above 
results suggest that the provision of reliability disclosures improves the market pricing of Level 3 
fair value assets, but does not have an effect on the market pricing of Level 1 and Level 2 fair 
value assets.25 
Next, we examine the effect of reliability disclosures on the information risk associated 
with the fair value estimates in Table 4. Panel A first presents the results using the equity-ratio-
adjusted market beta (Beta_adj) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 present the baseline 
                                                 
24 In Column 3, after selecting the same number from the treatment group (with reliability disclosures) and the 
control group (without reliability disclosures) based on the propensity score matching procedure, we perform t-tests 
to check whether those two groups have significantly different firm characteristics. None of the firm characteristic 
variables used in Equation (1) is significantly different between the treatment and control groups, indicating that the 
two groups are homogeneous in terms of their firm characteristics except for their reliability disclosure.    
25 One might interpret the negative and significant coefficient on FV_VolDisc in Column (3) as an indication that 
reliability disclosure reduces firm value. However, the presence of interaction terms confounds the interpretation of 
an on-average effect for reliability disclosure. In untabulated analyses, when we remove the interaction terms, we 
find a significantly positive coefficient on FV_VolDisc. Alternatively, we compute the averages of FVA1 s, FVA2 s 
and FVA3 s in this PSM sample and multiply them with the coefficients in Column (3). The averages of FVA1 s, 
FVA2 s, and FVA3 s in the PSM sample are 7.231, 48.835, and 6.154, respectively. The on-average effect of the 
reliability disclosure is 2.346 (= -4.054 + 0.102*7.231 + 0.092*48.835 + 0.190*6.154).  
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and full regression results, respectively, of estimating Equation (3). Columns 3, 4, and 5 present 
robustness analyses after using propensity score matching, including the inverse Mills ratio, and 
excluding firms with zero Level 3 fair value assets. The baseline regression shows that Level 3 
assets are associated with higher information risk, consistent with the notion that greater amounts 
of Level 3 assets entail larger estimation errors (Riedl and Serafeim 2011). Specifically, Column 
1 shows that the coefficient on FVA3 is 0.339 (t=3.36). When we interact our reliability 
disclosure variables with the fair value estimates in Column 2, we find that reliability disclosures 
only attenuate the relation between the Level 3 fair value estimates and information risk. 
Specifically, the coefficient on FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl is -0.318 (t=-3.26). The coefficients on 
FVA1 × FV_VolDiscl and FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl are statistically insignificant. As with the earlier 
market pricing tests, we determine if the sum of the coefficients on FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl and 
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl is greater than the coefficient on FVA1 × FV_VolDiscl. We still find a 
significant difference at the 5 percent level (F = 3.18, p < 0.037), implying that reliability 
disclosure has a relatively greater effect on reducing the information risk of market-to-model 
assets.  
In Columns 3 to 5, where we have alternative research designs for the effect of reliability 
disclosures on the information risk associated with the fair value estimates, we find that the 
coefficient on FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl is consistently negative and significant. We continue to find 
no evidence that reliability disclosures affect the relations between Level 1 and 2 fair value 
estimates and information risk.  
The inferences are generally the same when we use the equity-ratio-adjusted correlation 
between the firm-specific monthly returns and the value-weighted stock market returns 
(Correl_adj) as the dependent variable in Panel B. Specifically, Column 1 shows that the 
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coefficient on FVA3 is 0.063 (t=4.62). However, when we interact our reliability disclosure 
variables with the fair value estimates in Column 2, we find that the coefficient on FVA3 × 
FV_VolDiscl is -0.093 (t=-2.63), implying that reliability disclosures attenuate the relation 
between fair value estimates and the information risk. The F-tests of contrasts indicate that 
reliability disclosure has a relatively greater effect on reducing the information risk of market-to-
model assets, compared to market-to-market assets (F = 8.94, p < 0.001). The coefficient on 
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl remains negative and significant in Columns 3 to 5, and again we find 
little or no evidence that reliability disclosures affect the information risk associated with the 
Level 1 and 2 estimates. Taken together, our results in Table 4 provide robust evidence that 
reliability disclosures are able to mitigate the information risk inherent in Level 3 fair value 
estimates.26  
 
4.4 In-depth analysis of the nature of reliability disclosures - Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c 
In this section, we consider the nature of the reliability disclosures and formally test 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. We use the indicator variable External to denote firms that discuss 
how they obtain external and independent pricing of fair value estimates, Classification to 
indicate firms that discuss whether there are controls and procedures in place to ensure proper 
classification of the estimates according to the SFAS 157 three-level hierarchy, and Assurance to 
denote firms that provide an assurance of management’s responsibility in ensuring the reliability 
of fair value estimates. Appendix 1 shows how we identify whether a reliability disclosure 
contains any of the above components.27 Note that a reliability disclosure may contain more than 
                                                 
26 We note that the coefficient on FVA3 in Column 3 is insignificant. Hence, we should be cautious about 
interpreting the significant negative interaction effect between FVA3 and FV_VolDiscl as evidence that fair value 
reliability disclosures reduce the positive relation between information risk and Level 3 fair value assets. 
27 Similar to how we identify reliability disclosures, we asked our research assistants to read the reliability 




one component, as in the case of Newalliance Bancshares Inc. and Ace Ltd. (in Appendix 1), or 
none of them, as in the case of Ally Financial Inc. (in the introduction).28  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the frequency distribution for possible combinations of the 
three types of disclosures. The numbers of observations with External, Classification, and 
Assurance equaling one are 241, 93, and 207, respectively. Hence, approximately 53%, 21%, and 
46% of the 451 observations with reliability disclosures provide disclosures respectively related 
to External, Classification, and Assurance. The number (percentage) of observations with only 
one component, only two components, all three components, or with none of the components are 
130 (29%), 150 (33%), 37 (8%), and 134 (30%), respectively. Panel B presents the correlation 
matrix among the three attributes. In general, the correlations are positive and statistically 
significant. This indicates that many firms that disclose one particular attribute also disclose 
another. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the correlations suggests that the different attributes are 
capturing different dimensions of reliability disclosures. 
For the purpose of testing H2a, H2b, and H2c, we focus on how the interaction between 
the contents of the reliability disclosures and the Level 3 fair value estimates affects market 
pricing and information risk. We do so because prior literature focuses on the relatively more 
opaque fair value estimates and our earlier results indicate that only FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl is 
significantly associated with market pricing and information risk. Furthermore, multi-collinearity 
becomes a concern when multiple interaction terms are introduced into the regression. Panel C of 
Table 5 presents the regression results for estimating Equation (2), with External, Classification, 
and Assurance replacing FV_VolDiscl. Column 1 presents the results of the main regression, and 
                                                 
28 In the case of Ally Financial Inc., although the firm discusses at length the numerous internal controls in place to 
ensure the appropriateness of fair value measurements, none of them pertains to the external and independent pricing 
of fair value estimates or the estimates’ proper classification according to the SFAS 157 three-level hierarchy, nor 




Columns 2 and 3 present the results after using the propensity score matching approach and 
including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the determinants regression, respectively.  
First, we find that the coefficient on FVA3 × External is 0.095 (t=3.40) and 0.071 (t=3.14) 
in Columns 1 and 3, respectively. These results suggest that disclosures of how the firm obtains 
external and independent pricing improves the market pricing of the Level 3 fair value estimates. 
Second, we find that the disclosures of how the firm ensures the proper classification of the fair 
value estimates according to the SFAS 157 fair value hierarchy also improves the market pricing 
of Level 3 fair value assets. Specifically, the coefficient on FVA3 × Classification is 0.056 
(t=1.89), 0.235 (t=4.64), and 0.034 (t=2.08) in Columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Third, we do 
not find evidence that disclosures that provide an assurance of management’s responsibility in 
ensuring the reliability of their fair value estimates improves the market pricing of the Level 3 
fair value assets.  
Next, we examine how the contents of reliability disclosures affect the information risk 
associated with Level 3 fair value estimates by re-estimating Equation (3) but replacing 
FV_VolDiscl with External, Classification, and Assurance. Panels D and E present the results 
using the equity-ratio-adjusted market beta (Beta_adj) and the equity-ratio-adjusted correlation 
between the firm-specific monthly returns and the value-weighted stock market returns 
(Correl_adj), respectively, as the dependent variable. Column 1 presents the results of the main 
regression, and Columns 2 and 3 present the results using, respectively, propensity score 
matching and after including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the determinants regression. 
The results are largely similar for both panels. Specifically, the coefficients on FVA3 × External 
are negative and statistically significant across all specifications in both panels, providing strong 
evidence that disclosures of how the firm obtains external and independent pricing of fair value 
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estimates reduces the information risk associated with Level 3 fair value estimates. Likewise, the 
coefficients on FVA3 × Classification are negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
or better across all specifications in Panels D and E. This result suggests that disclosures of how 
the firm ensures the proper classification of the fair value estimates according to the SFAS 157 
fair value hierarchy reduces the information risk associated with the Level 3 fair value estimates. 
Finally, the coefficient on FVA3 × Assurance does not load significantly in any of these tests. 
Hence, the results suggest that disclosures that offer assurances about management’s 
responsibility in ensuring the reliability of fair value estimates do not alleviate the information 
risk associated with Level 3 estimates. One possible explanation for the weak results on 
assurance disclosures is that management is already assumed to be responsible for these 
estimates, since Sarbanes Oxley Section 302 requires them to certify the firm’s financial 
statements. To the extent that these assurance disclosures might overlap with mandatory 
disclosures under other requirements (e.g., CEO/CFO responsibility for financial statements 
under Sarbanes Oxley Section 302), this can work against our finding significant results for this 
test. 
Taken together, our analyses in this section provide additional insights into the contents 
of the reliability disclosures that provide information that is useful to investors. We find robust 
evidence that disclosure of how the firm obtains external and independent pricing of fair value 
estimates and ensures the proper classification of the estimates according to the SFAS 157 three-
level hierarchy are important in reducing investors’ uncertainty about Level 3 estimates. Hence, 
investors do not simply regard the reliability disclosures that firms provide to enhance the 





4.5 Additional analyses 
In this section, we provide additional analyses to ascertain the impact of reliability 
disclosures on a firm’s information environment as well as robustness checks to assess the 
reliability of our results.  
 
4.5.1 Reliability disclosures and analysts’ forecasts  
One issue with the more opaque fair value assets is that there tends to be less consensus 
about these assets’ future earnings implications. In this section, we examine the relation between 
analysts’ earnings forecast consensus and the different levels of fair value estimates. We 
introduce this test as an additional analysis because of the significant reduction in sample size 
when analyst forecast consensus is the outcome variable. We use the analyst-based consensus 
measure proposed by Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998).  This measure represents 
commonality in analysts’ information sets, and is defined as the across-analyst correlation in 
forecast errors. As before, we regress the consensus measure on the three-level fair values as 
well as their interactions with reliability disclosures, with appropriate controls for Consensus.29 
The results are presented in Table 6. We find significantly negative coefficients on FVA3 and 
significantly positive coefficients on FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl at the one percent level in most of the 
specifications. This suggests that Level 3 assets reduce the degree of analysts’ consensus, but 
that the presence of reliability disclosures mitigates this reduction.  
                                                 
29 The consensus measures are constructed based on analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecasts issued within the 
45-day window following the 10-K filing date. Consistent with the information risk tests, we include the ratio of the 
non-fair value assets to total assets (NFVA) and Leverage. We also control for information that is available prior to 
the 10-K filing dates by including the information released at annual earnings announcement dates. ABS Prior 
Return is the absolute value of the return from the next day of the fiscal year-ending date to the two trading days 
prior to the 10-K filing date. Because of the potential effect of management forecasts on analysts’ information sets, 
we include an indicator variable to capture the effect of management forecasting. Mgt Forecast is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm provides an annual earnings forecast for the next fiscal year prior to the filing date, and zero 
otherwise. To control for the level of firm-specific consensus prior to the dissemination of the 10-K report, we also 
include Pre_consensus, which is measured by analysts’ most recent earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year issued 




4.5.2 Word count analysis 
We also conduct a word count analysis to examine whether the amount of reliability 
disclosure influences the market pricing and information risk associated with fair value estimates. 
To do so, we use a continuous variable (FV_VolDiscl_Words) in place of our indicator variable 
(FV_VolDiscl). Our measure is the raw word count of these reliability disclosures. Accordingly, 
we re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) by replacing FV_VolDiscl with FV_VolDiscl_Words.  
Table 7 presents the additional analyses based on the word count of these reliability 
disclosures. Using word count instead of a dummy indicator, our results are consistent with our 
previous results suggesting that reliability disclosures help mitigate the lower market pricing and 
higher information risk of Level 3 fair value estimates. Specifically, we find that the coefficient 
on FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl_Words is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in our value 
relevance test (Share Price), and negative and significant at the 5 percent level or better in our 
information risk tests (Beta_adj and Correl_adj).   
 
4.5.3 Change analysis  
In our last table, we conduct a change analysis to provide further evidence on the link 
between reliability disclosures and the market pricing and information risk associated with fair 
value estimates. The advantage of a change analysis is that it uses the same firm as its own 
control and thus mitigates the omitted correlated variable concern by controlling for time-
invariant firm characteristics. Specifically, we examine how the initiation of reliability 
disclosures changes the market pricing and information risk associated with three-level fair value 
assets compared to firms without such disclosure. In this analysis, the treatment firms are firms 
that did not make reliability disclosures during the early sample period, but started providing 
them later. Control firms are selected from among those firms without reliability disclosures. 
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Specifically, we first select firms that do not provide reliability disclosures during the sample 
period. Then, we combine the treatment firms with those firms without reliability disclosures. 
Finally, using the propensity score matching procedure, we select the same number of control 
firms.30 Our final sample consists of 51 treatment firms and 51 control firms.  
Table 8 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 show that the coefficient on ∆FVA3 × 
Treatment is positive and significant, suggesting that firms that first initiate reliability disclosures 
experience a greater increase in the market pricing of Level 3 fair value estimates than do the 
control firms. However, as shown in Columns 3 to 6, we fail to find any evidence that firms that 
first initiate reliability disclosures experience a greater reduction in the information risk 
associated with Level 3 fair value estimates. The insignificant results for the information risk 
regressions could be due to the small sample size in the change analyses, as reliability 
disclosures are generally sticky over time.31  
 
4.5.4 Controlling for the disclosure of internal control weaknesses 
 Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act requires that firms’ independent auditors 
provide an opinion on their clients’ internal controls over financial reporting, in addition to their 
opinion of their clients’ financial statements (Sarbanes-Oxley 2002). It is possible that firms with 
internal control weaknesses (ICWs) are less likely to provide voluntary reliability disclosures and 
that disclosed ICWs can affect market pricing and information risk. In other words, ICWs 
                                                 
30 We use Equation (1) as a selection model in this propensity score matching (PSM) procedure. Given that the 
initiation year of reliability disclosure varies by firms, we first select the one-on-one matched control firms using the 
PSM procedure, and then use as a control sample the matched control firm’s fiscal year observation, which is the 
same as the reliability disclosure initiation year of the treatment firm. For example, firm A initiated reliability 
disclosure in 2009. Using the PSM procedure, we find a control firm and use this control firm’s 2009 observation as 
the control sample. To find the one-on-one matched control firms, we compute the averages of the determinant 
variables in Equation (1) during our sample period and run the equation with the averages.   
31 We also examine whether a change analysis at the quarterly level will reveal substantial variation in the reliability 
disclosures. We hand-collect the 10-Q reports from five different firms for each year to compare with the disclosures 
in the 10-K reports. We find that there is little variation in disclosure. As with the 10-K reports, firms that started 




disclosed under SOX may confound our results on the determinants and consequences of 
reliability disclosures. We mitigate this concern in two ways. First, in all our earlier regressions, 
we include an indicator variable, ICW, that equals 1 if the firm reported ICWs under Section 404 
of SOX.32 We find that all our earlier results (untabulated) continue to hold. Second, we repeat 
all our earlier regression analyses after deleting firm-year observations with ICWs. All our 
earlier results (untabulated) remain qualitatively the same. In sum, the incidence of ICWs 
mandatorily disclosed under Section 404 of SOX does not affect the main inferences of our study.   
 
4.5.5 Controlling for disclosures prior to filing dates 
We also control for disclosures made prior to the filing dates. Specifically, we include an 
indicator variable that proxies for whether the firm provides a management forecast in the next 
fiscal year and the absolute value of returns measured from the day after the fiscal year ending 
date to the two trading days prior to the filing because market price or information risk might be 
affected by these two variables. Hence, we run the market pricing and information risk 
regressions after these variables are added. The results (untabulated) remain qualitatively the 
same.  
 
4.5.6 Deleting observations from the 2007-2008 crisis period 
During the crisis period, the stock prices of the financial institutions tumbled severely. 
Given that one of our main dependent variables is the firm’s stock price, it is important to 
examine how the crisis period observations affect our findings. Since we use 10-K filing month-
end prices and information risk proxies that are measured up to the filing month, we first delete 
observations whose filing years are in the crisis period. We find 19 observations from the year 
2008. Dropping those 19 observations does not notably alter the results, nor does it impact our 
                                                 
32 4.7 percent of our firm-year observations used in the determinants regression have ICWs.  
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inferences in any way. Next, instead of the filing years, we classify the observations by the fiscal 
years and drop observations for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. We find 19 and 550 observations 
from fiscal years 2007 and 2008, respectively. Even after dropping those 569 observations, we 
still obtain qualitatively similar results.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper attempts to shed light on the determinants and consequences of the voluntary 
disclosures that firms provide about the controls, processes, and procedures in place to ensure the 
validity of SFAS 157 fair value estimates (“reliability disclosures”). With regard to the 
determinants, we find that more opaque fair value estimates are associated with a greater 
likelihood of reliability disclosure provision.  An important implication of these results is that 
firms with more opaque fair value estimates are more likely to voluntarily provide reliability 
disclosures, presumably to alleviate investors’ concerns about these fair value estimates. We also 
examine whether reliability disclosures enhance the credibility of more opaque fair value 
estimates. We find that higher market pricing and lower information risk are associated with 
Level 3 estimates when firms provide reliability disclosures. Finally, our content analysis reveals 
that reliability disclosures that discuss the external and independent pricing of fair value 
estimates and the proper classification of these estimates according to the SFAS 157 hierarchy 
are particularly important to investors. Notwithstanding these findings’ significance, one 
important caveat to our study is that our results might be driven by a small subset of firms in the 
sample that have substantial exposure to Level 3 fair values. 
Our study extends prior research on the role of additional disclosures in the fair value 
reporting setting under SFAS 157. In line with previous research, we show that various economic 
determinants drive managers’ strategies to provide fair value disclosures. In particular, we 
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leverage on the unique features of the three-level fair value hierarchy to provide evidence that 
the relative opacity of different input measurements impacts managerial decisions about 
providing additional fair value disclosures to aid users’ decision making. We also show that this 
strategy is effective in increasing the credibility of Level 3 estimates, which are associated with 
greater investor skepticism. These results support the move towards expanded fair value 
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Appendix 1: Examples of reliability disclosures and identification of the content of 
reliability disclosures 
The following are some examples of reliability disclosures. In our content analysis, we further 
identify whether a reliability disclosure discusses the external and independent pricing of fair 
value estimates (External =1); proper classification of the estimates, according to the SFAS 157 
three-level hierarchy (Classification =1); and an assurance of management’s responsibility in 
ensuring the reliability of the fair value estimates (Assurance =1). The use of italics refers to the 
content identified for each component.   
 
Navigators Group, Form 10-K, 2010 (External =1) 
 
All prices for our fixed maturities, short-term investments and equity securities valued as Level 1, 
Level 2 or Level 3 in the fair value hierarchy, as defined in the Financial Accounts Standards 
Board Accounting Standards Codification 820 (“ASC 820”), Fair Value Measurements, are 
received from independent pricing services utilized by one of our outside investment managers 
whom we employ to assist us with investment accounting services. This manager utilizes a 
pricing committee which approves the use of one or more independent pricing service vendors. 
The pricing committee consists of five or more members, one from senior management and one 
from the accounting group with the remainder from the asset class specialists and client 
strategists. The pricing source of each security is determined in accordance with the pricing 
source procedures approved by the pricing committee. The investment manager uses supporting 
documentation received from the independent pricing service vendor detailing the inputs, models 
and processes used in the independent pricing service vendors’ evaluation process to determine 
the appropriate fair value hierarchy. Any pricing where the input is based solely on a broker 
price is deemed to be a Level 3 price. 
 
Newalliance Bancshares Inc., Form 10-K, 2009 (External =1; Classification =1) 
 
The Company utilizes Interactive Data Corp., a third-party, nationally-recognized pricing 
service (“IDC”) to estimate fair value measurements for 98.7% of this portfolio. The pricing 
service evaluates each asset class based on relevant market information considering observable 
data that may include dealer quotes, reported trades, market spreads, cash flows, the U.S. 
Treasury yield curve, the LIBOR swap yield curve, trade execution data, market prepayment 
speeds, credit information and the bond’s terms and conditions, among other things, but these 
prices are not binding quotes. The fair value prices on all investment securities are reviewed for 
reasonableness by management through an extensive process. This review process was 
implemented to determine any unusual market price fluctuations and the analysis includes 
changes in the LIBOR / swap curve, the treasury curve, mortgage rates and credit spreads as well 
as a review of the securities inventory list which details issuer name, coupon and maturity date. 
The review resulted in no adjustments to the IDC pricing as of December 31, 2009. Also, 
management assessed the valuation techniques used by IDC based on a review of their pricing 






Appendix 1 (continued)  
 
Ace Ltd., Form 10-K, 2011 (Assurance =1; External =1) 
 
While we obtain values for the majority of the investment securities we hold from one or more 
pricing services, it is ultimately management’s responsibility to determine whether the values 
obtained and recorded in the financial statements are representative of fair value. We 
periodically update our understanding of the methodologies used by our pricing services in order 
to validate that the prices obtained from those services are consistent with the GAAP definition 
of fair value as an exit price. Based on our understanding of the methodologies, our pricing 
services only produce an estimate of fair value if there is observable market information that 
would allow them to make a fair value estimate. Based on our understanding of the market inputs 
used by our pricing services, all applicable investments have been valued in accordance with 
GAAP valuation principles. We have controls to review significant price changes and stale 
pricing, and to ensure that prices received from pricing services have been accurately reflected 














10-K filing month-end price per share. 
 
Beta_adj Equity beta, which is the coefficient from a regression of firm-specific monthly 
returns on value-weighted stock market returns, multiplied by the ratio of common 
equity to total assets. 
 
Correl_adj Correlation between firm-specific monthly returns and value-weighted stock market 
returns, multiplied by the ratio of common equity to total assets. The equity beta and 
the correlation are measured in the period from the month following the last fiscal 




FV_VolDiscl Indicator variable that equals one if a company provides a reliability disclosure in a 
given fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
 
FVA1 Level 1 fair value assets to total assets. 
FVA2 Level 2 fair value assets to total assets. 
FVA3 Level 3 fair value assets to total assets. 
FVA1s Level 1 fair value assets per share. 
FVA2 s Level 2 fair value assets per share. 
FVA3 s Level 3 fair value assets per share. 
External Indicator variable that equals one if the reliability disclosures discuss the controls and 
procedures in place to obtain external and independent pricing of fair value estimates, 
zero otherwise. 
 
Classification Indicator variable that equals one if the reliability disclosures discuss the controls and 
procedures for the proper classification of the estimates according to the SFAS 157 
three-level hierarchy, zero otherwise. 
 
Assurance Indicator variable that equals one if the reliability disclosures include an assurance of 





FVL Fair value liabilities to total assets. 
NFVA Non-fair value assets to total assets. 
FVL s Fair value liabilities per share. 
NFVA s Non-fair value assets per share. 
NFVL s Non-fair value liabilities per share. 
Leverage Ratio of the total liabilities to total assets. 
Net Income Earnings before extraordinary items per share. 
10-K Words The total number of words in a 10-K, scaled by 1,000. 
Big 4 Auditor Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Early Adoption Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts SFAS 157 before the mandated 
implementation date. 
 
Segment Number of business segments in which the firm operates. 
Log Market Cap Natural log of Market Cap (in $ mil).  
Inst Hold Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors. 
Coverage Number of analysts covering the firm in the month before the month of the filing 
date. 
 
Litigation Measure of litigation risk based on Rogers and Stocken (2005). 
Age Number of years listed. 
Mgt Forecast Indicator variable that equals one if, prior to the filing date, the firm provided an 
annual earnings-per-share management forecast for the next fiscal year and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Tobin’s Q The sum of the equity market value and total liability book value to total assets. 
ROA Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets.  
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Loss Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm’s earnings before extraordinary items in a 
given year is negative, and zero otherwise. 
 





TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main analyses in this paper. The variable 
definitions are found in Appendix 2.   
 
  Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
              
 
FV_VolDiscl 0.196 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Share Price 16.948 25.947 1.520 5.550 11.100 19.960 47.010 
Beta_adj 0.125 0.193 -0.041 0.036 0.089 0.162 0.401 
Correl_adj 0.061 0.077 -0.017 0.018 0.045 0.081 0.212 
FVA1 0.029 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.165 
FVA2 0.217 0.185 0.001 0.092 0.173 0.277 0.609 
FVA3 0.017 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.053 
FVL 0.007 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.023 
NFVA 0.741 0.216 0.256 0.684 0.808 0.886 0.981 
FVA1s 5.539 25.503 0.000 0.000 0.114 1.829 19.522 
FVA2 s 42.260 83.428 0.016 8.950 20.598 42.860 130.891 
FVA3 s 3.710 32.876 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.805 11.078 
FVL s 4.175 39.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.157 8.952 
NFVA s 121.473 145.456 12.961 54.046 100.049 151.208 275.860 
NFVL s 149.904 186.531 15.872 65.999 118.404 173.405 369.565 
Leverage 0.855 0.128 0.583 0.855 0.897 0.918 0.954 
Net Income 0.241 4.439 -5.014 -0.265 0.584 1.485 4.173 
Early Adoption 0.039 0.194 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10-K Words 60.139 29.792 24.367 43.353 55.853 70.484 106.191 
Big4 Auditor 0.463 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Segment 2.100 2.907 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 9.000 
Market Cap (in $ millions)  2,808 13,146 11 41 182 856 11,776 
Inst Hold 38.144 30.072 0.157 10.919 31.318 63.819 89.952 
Coverage 4.165 5.659 0.000 0.000 2.000 6.000 17.000 
Litigation  -4.347 0.540 -4.976 -4.723 -4.445 -4.111 -3.352 
Age 16.253 10.496 3.000 8.000 14.000 23.000 39.000 
Mgt Forecast 0.098 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Tobin’s Q 1.024 0.345 0.913 0.951 0.980 1.020 1.158 
ROA  0.002 0.046 -0.045 -0.003 0.005 0.009 0.042 
Loss 0.294 0.456 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 




TABLE 2: Determinants of reliability disclosures 
 
These panels present analyses of the determinants of reliability disclosures. Panel A presents the mean and median values of the fair value estimates based on the 
SFAS 157 three-level hierarchy and firm characteristics by firms with and without reliability disclosures. Panel B presents the results of the probit regressions 
used to examine the factors influencing the incidence of fair value reliability disclosures. The dependent variable is FV_VolDiscl. Column 1 presents the results 
of the main regression that examines the factors. Column 2 presents the robustness analysis after excluding firm-years with zero Level 3 fair value assets.  All the 
variables are defined in Appendix 2. t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for 
within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analyses 
 Mean Median 
 
FV_VolDiscl = 1 FV_VolDiscl = 0 Mean Diff. 
t-test 





FVA1 0.053 0.023 0.030 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.000 
FVA2 0.361 0.181 0.181 0.000 0.333 0.159 0.174 0.000 
FVA3 0.034 0.012 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 
FVL 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Early Adoption 0.055 0.035 0.020 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 
10-K Words 84.341 54.122 30.219 0.000 73.723 52.195 21.528 0.000 
Big4 Auditor 0.856 0.365 0.490 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Segment 3.532 1.744 1.788 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Cap 9973 1026 8946 0.000 1289 118 1171 0.000 
Inst Hold 59.794 32.762 27.033 0.000 66.988 24.754 42.233 0.000 
Coverage 7.987 3.215 4.772 0.000 6.000 1.000 5.000 0.000 
Litigation -4.003 -4.433 0.429 0.000 -4.130 -4.523 0.393 0.000 
Age 21.780 14.879 6.902 0.000 20.000 13.000 7.000 0.000 
Mgt Forecast 0.206 0.072 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tobin’s Q 0.986 1.033 -0.047 0.001 0.980 0.980 0.000 0.146 
ROA  0.004 0.001 0.003 0.225 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.000 
Loss 0.237 0.308 -0.071 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Leverage 0.835 0.862 -0.027 0.000 0.877 0.901 -0.024 0.000 
Observations 451 1,814 
 
 451 1,814   
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Panel B: Probit regression results (FV_VolDiscl as dependent variable) 
 
 (1) (2) 
FVA1  + 0.098 0.306 
  (0.15) (0.37) 
FVA2 (H1: +) + 0.803** 0.676* 
  (2.36) (1.77) 
FVA3 (H1: +) + 2.097*** 1.975*** 
  (3.12) (2.80) 
FVL ? 0.264 0.433 
  (0.23) (0.39) 
Early Adoption + -0.142 -0.088 
  (-0.65) (-0.32) 
10-K Words + 0.007** 0.006* 
  (2.34) (1.67) 
Big4 Auditor + 0.451** 0.448*** 
  (2.52) (2.79) 
Segment + -0.026 -0.022 
  (-1.26) (-1.06) 
Log Market Cap + 0.192*** 0.198** 
  (2.85) (2.25) 
Inst Hold + 0.005** 0.007** 
  (2.00) (2.42) 
Coverage + 0.003 -0.005 
  (0.28) (-0.35) 
Litigation - -0.206** -0.171** 
  (-2.01) (-2.16) 
Age + 0.001 0.003 
  (0.09) (0.52) 
Mgt Forecast + -0.115 -0.104 
  (-0.73) (-0.58) 
Tobin’s Q - -3.262*** -3.209*** 
  (-3.92) (-2.94) 
ROA - 2.703* 3.375 
  (1.70) (1.46) 
Loss + 0.158* 0.082 
  (1.71) (0.49) 
Leverage + 2.334*** 2.253*** 
  (3.33) (2.87) 
Constant  -2.091*** -2.018** 
  (-2.68) (-2.35) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Observations  2,265 1,298 





TABLE 3: Market pricing effect of reliability disclosures 
 
This table presents the results of the regression used to examine the effect of reliability disclosures on the market 
pricing of the three-level fair value estimates. The dependent variable is Share Price. Column 1 presents the baseline 
regression that examines the market pricing of the three-level fair value estimates without conditioning on reliability 
disclosures. Column 2 presents the results of the main regression that examines the effect of reliability disclosures 
on such market pricing. Columns 3, 4, and 5 present robustness analyses after using propensity score matching 
(“PSM”), adding the inverse Mills ratio (“IMR”), and excluding firms with zero Level 3 fair value assets (“Non-
zero”). Equation (1) is used as a selection model to find the control firms in the propensity score matching analysis 
and to compute the inverse Mills ratio. All the variables are defined in Appendix 2.  t-statistics, in parentheses, are 
indicated below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and 














FVA1 s + 0.916*** 0.903*** 0.817*** 0.908*** 0.782*** 
  (25.00) (50.77) (16.30) (39.69) (12.28) 
FVA2 s + 0.828*** 0.796*** 0.721*** 0.804*** 0.735*** 
  (18.19) (32.31) (12.90) (31.23) (14.36) 
FVA3 s + 0.826*** 0.673*** 0.518*** 0.726*** 0.590*** 
  (16.45) (7.59) (5.42) (7.90) (7.64) 
FV_VolDiscl ?  -0.448 -4.054*** 0.401 -0.637 
   (-0.85) (-5.03) (0.67) (-0.92) 
FVA1s × FV_VolDiscl ?  -0.006 0.102* -0.001 0.011 
   (-0.15) (1.89) (-0.04) (0.67) 
FVA2s × FV_VolDiscl  +  0.008 0.092*** 0.009 0.008 
(H2: +)   (0.57) (4.47) (0.59) (0.49) 
FVA3s × FV_VolDiscl  +  0.133*** 0.190*** 0.084 0.150** 
(H2: +)   (2.23) (3.60) (1.41) (2.43) 
NFVA s + 0.827*** 0.810*** 0.751*** 0.816*** 0.746*** 
  (17.12) (21.54) (17.64) (20.19) (20.49) 
NFVL s - -0.849*** -0.830*** -0.768*** -0.836*** -0.761*** 
  (-17.95) (-24.06) (-15.32) (-22.16) (-17.48) 
FVL s - -0.840*** -0.818*** -0.690*** -0.824*** -0.751*** 
  (-16.62) (-23.67) (-12.64) (-23.03) (-15.83) 
Net Income + 0.947*** 1.064*** 1.164*** 1.104*** 0.942*** 
  (4.13) (5.78) (5.22) (5.47) (3.29) 
Inverse Mills     1.148***  
     (3.62)  
Constant  3.088*** 3.734*** 5.525*** 0.980 4.098*** 
  (3.66) (5.19) (3.68) (0.97) (3.98) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,205 2,200 572 2,164 1,255 
Adjusted R-squared  0.840 0.858 0.920 0.846 0.827 
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TABLE 4: Information risk effect of reliability disclosures 
 
This table presents the results of the regression used to examine the effect of reliability disclosures on the 
information risk associated with three-level fair value estimates.  In Panel A (Panel B), the dependent variable is 
Beta_adj (Correl_adj). Column 1 presents the baseline regression that examines the information risk associated with 
three-level fair value estimates without conditioning on reliability disclosures. Column 2 presents the results of the 
main regression that examines the effect of reliability disclosures on the information risk associated with three-level 
fair value estimates. Columns 3, 4, and 5 present robustness analyses after using propensity score matching (“PSM”), 
adding the inverse Mills ratio (“IMR"), and excluding firms with zero Level 3 fair value assets (“Non-zero”). 
Equation (1) is used as a selection model to find the control firms in the propensity score matching analysis and to 
compute the inverse Mills ratio. All the variables are defined in Appendix 2. t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated 
below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year 
correlations in residuals. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
 













       
FVA1 + 0.072 0.006 0.045 -0.009 0.107 
  (1.39) (0.11) (0.32) (-0.17) (1.16) 
FVA2 + 0.105* 0.007 -0.011 0.032 0.018 
  (1.92) (1.20) (-0.08) (0.53) (0.35) 
FVA3 + 0.339*** 0.510*** 0.465* 0.469*** 0.379*** 
  (3.36) (1.93) (1.81) (3.42) (2.65) 
FV_VolDiscl ?  0.027*** 0.005 0.013 0.021*** 
   (3.67) (0.39) (1.32) (2.72) 
FVA1 × FV_VolDiscl ?  0.111 0.067 0.107 0.101 
   (0.75) (0.26) (0.73) (0.69) 
FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl  -  0.000 -0.002 0.007 0.023 
(H2: -)   (0.01)  (-0.03)  (0.25)  (0.89)  
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl  -  -0.318*** -0.335*** -0.272*** -0.252*** 
(H2: -)   (-3.26) (-3.26) (-3.76) (-2.61) 
NFVA + 0.111** 0.009* 0.015 0.078* 0.053 
  (2.35) (1.80) (0.12) (1.66) (1.06) 
Leverage - -0.562*** -0.562*** -0.475*** -0.550*** -0.600*** 
  (-11.24) (-13.27) (-7.69) (-14.93) (-13.52) 
Inverse Mills     -0.018***  
     (-2.84)  
Constant  0.515*** 0.525*** 0.538*** 0.561*** 0.591*** 
  (6.56) (6.68) (3.02) (7.04) (6.97) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,231 2,231 595 2,182 1,270 

















       
FVA1 + -0.012 -0.032 -0.010 -0.041* -0.033 
  (-0.55) (-1.60) (-0.31) (-1.95) (-1.35) 
FVA2 + 0.031*** 0.023** -0.020 0.006 0.013 
  (3.46) (2.03) (-0.68) (0.42) (1.04) 
FVA3 + 0.063*** 0.088*** 0.060 0.067** 0.050** 
  (4.62) (2.96) (1.57) (2.09) (1.99) 
FV_VolDiscl ?  0.016*** 0.010* 0.010** 0.013** 
   (2.68) (1.82) (2.16) (2.14) 
FVA1 × FV_VolDiscl ?  0.047 0.023 0.044 0.055 
   (1.30) (0.38) (1.16) (1.41) 
FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl  -  -0.010 -0.016 -0.006 -0.005 
(H2: -)   (-0.84) (-0.62) (-0.54) (-0.33) 
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl  -  -0.093*** -0.133*** -0.090*** -0.076*** 
(H2: -)   (-2.63) (-4.38) (-2.66) (-2.62) 
NFVA + 0.011 0.007* -0.055** -0.002 -0.007*** 
  (1.06) (1.93) (-2.38) (-0.27) (-2.04) 
Leverage - -0.434*** -0.436*** -0.422*** -0.442*** -0.449*** 
  (-23.90) (-25.14) (-17.69) (-29.92) (-21.78) 
Inverse Mills     -0.008***  
     (-2.82)  
Constant  0.429*** 0.430*** 0.470*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 
  (17.22) (19.04) (10.78) (21.28) (17.27) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,215 2,218 592 2,168 1,259 
Adjusted R-squared  0.625 0.629 0.664 0.639 0.681 
 
  








TABLE 5: Content analyses based on types of reliability disclosures 
 
These panels present analyses on the contents of the reliability disclosures. Panel A reports the frequency of each 
type of reliability disclosure (External, Classification, and Assurance). Panel B presents the correlations among the 
three attributes. Panels C, D, and E present the results of the regression used to examine how the contents of the 
reliability disclosures affect the market pricing and information risk associated with Level 3 fair value estimates. 
Specifically, Panel C reports the results of estimating Equation (2) by replacing FV_VolDiscl with the contents of 
the reliability disclosures. Panels D and E report the results of estimating regression (3) with External, Classification, 
and Assurance. In Panels C, D and E, Column 1 presents the results of the main regression. Columns 2 and 3 present 
robustness analyses after using propensity score matching (“PSM”) and adding the inverse Mills ratio (“IMR"), 
respectively.  Equation (1) is used as a selection model to compute the inverse Mills ratio and to find the control 
firms in the propensity score matching analysis. To save space, we report only the coefficients for our interaction 
variables of interest. All the variables are defined in Appendix 2. t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated below the 
coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in 
residuals. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel A: Frequency of each type of reliability disclosures 
 
  External Classification Assurance Number of observations 
 
Yes No  No 55 
 
No Yes No 7 
 
No No  Yes 68 
 
Yes Yes No 48 
 
Yes No  Yes 101 
 
No Yes Yes 1 
 
Yes Yes  Yes 37 
 
No No No 134 
Total number of observations  
(with reliability disclosures) 
   
451 
Number of observations 
with a specific type  241 93 207    
 
Panel B: Correlations among the three types of reliability disclosures 
  Classification 
 
Assurance 
External 0.542 0.576 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Classification  0.228 













FVA3 × External (H2a: +) + 0.095*** -0.074 0.071*** 
  (3.40) (-0.59) (3.14) 
FVA3 × Classification (H2b: +) + 0.056* 0.235*** 0.034** 
  (1.89) (4.64) (2.08) 
FVA3 × Assurance (H2c: +) + 0.011 0.179 0.026 
  (0.20) (1.22) (0.49) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,197 576 2,162 












FVA3 × External (H2a: -) - -0.278*** -0.444*** -0.300*** 
  (-3.13) (-3.16) (-2.72) 
FVA3 × Classification (H2b: -) - -0.187* -0.393*** -0.230** 
  (-1.72) (-5.72) (-2.27) 
FVA3 × Assurance (H2c: -) - 0.211 -0.016 0.155 
  (0.49) (-0.04) (0.38) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,230 596 2,183 












FVA3 × External (H2a: -) - -0.100*** -0.119*** -0.096*** 
  (-8.64) (-13.14) (-7.00) 
FVA3 × Classification (H2b: -) - -0.102*** -0.123*** -0.106*** 
  (-6.13) (-4.31) (-6.83) 
FVA3 × Assurance (H2c: -) - -0.029 -0.010 -0.031 
  (-0.36) (-0.08) (-0.42) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  2,217 592 2,172 




TABLE 6: Additional analyses based on analysts' consensus  
This table presents the results of the regressions used to examine how the three-level fair value assets affect analysts' 
earnings forecast consensus and the effect of the reliability disclosure on the association between the consensus and 
the three-level estimates. Column 1 presents the baseline regression that examines analysts’ consensus associated 
with the three-level fair value estimates without conditioning on reliability disclosures. And Column 2 presents the 
results of the main regression conditioning on the reliability disclosures. Columns 3, 4, and 5 present robustness 
analyses after using propensity score matching, adding the inverse Mills ratio and excluding firms with zero Level 3 
fair value assets. Equation (1) is used as a selection model to find the control firms in the propensity score matching 
analysis and to compute the inverse Mills ratio. Consensus is the across-analyst correlation in forecast errors as 
developed by Barron et al. (1998) and measured with analysts' one-year-ahead earnings forecasts issued within a 45-
day window following the year t 10-K filing date. ABS Prior Return is the absolute value of returns measured from 
the next day of the fiscal year ending date to the two trading days prior to the filing date. Pre_Consensus is 
measured with analysts' earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year issued in the period between the forty five and two 
days prior to the filing date. All the other variables are defined in Appendix 2. t-statistics, in parentheses, are 
indicated below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and 















       
FVA1  0.178 -0.097 -0.704 -0.076 -0.054 
  (0.79) (-0.27) (-1.33) (-0.21) (-0.13) 
FVA2  -0.047 -0.218 -0.097 -0.198 -0.192 
  (-0.49) (-0.92) (-0.46) (-0.91) (-0.79) 
FVA3  -0.166 -1.114*** -1.103*** -1.061*** -1.041*** 
  (-0.81) (-4.83) (-7.68) (-6.96) (-7.43) 
FV_VolDiscl   -0.065* -0.009 -0.060 -0.035 
   (-1.71) (-0.12) (-1.46) (-0.57) 
FVA1 × FV_VolDiscl   0.556*** 0.981* 0.518*** 0.436 
   (3.10) (1.76) (2.81) (1.64) 
FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl    0.153 -0.012 0.144 0.110 
   (0.80) (-0.09) (0.79) (0.52) 
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl    1.000*** 1.140*** 1.005*** 0.927*** 
   (4.37) (4.68) (4.73) (4.32) 
NFVA  0.122 -0.003 -0.112 0.025 -0.022 
  (1.08) (-0.02) (-0.55) (0.14) (-0.10) 
Leverage  -0.322*** -0.337*** -0.241 -0.297* -0.290** 
  (-3.25) (-2.67) (-1.38) (-1.90) (-2.05) 
Mgt Forecast  -0.056 -0.042 -0.061 -0.041 -0.021 
  (-1.09) (-0.93) (-1.00) (-0.93) (-0.30) 
ABS Prior Return  0.082*** 0.082** 0.025 0.066* 0.113** 
  (3.73) (2.52) (0.27) (1.95) (2.31) 
Pre_consensus  0.582*** 0.586*** 0.745*** 0.591*** 0.622*** 
  (8.01) (7.80) (6.34) (7.69) (5.78) 
Inverse Mills     0.004  
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     (0.36)  
Constant  0.525*** 0.669** 0.513 0.611** 0.595* 
  (3.13) (2.42) (1.40) (2.10) (1.80) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  474 473 183 464 358 






TABLE 7: Additional analyses based on word count  
 
This table presents the results of the regressions from our main tests in Tables 3 and 4 by replacing our indicator 
variable (FV_VolDiscl) with a continuous variable (FV_VolDiscl_Words). FV_VolDiscl_Words is the word count of 
the reliability disclosures. All the other variables are defined in Appendix 2. t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated 
below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year 












FVA1  0.977*** 0.057 -0.016 
 
(19.36) (1.36) (-0.62) 
FVA2  0.807*** 0.090 0.030*** 
 
(19.07) (1.51) (3.07) 
FVA3  0.727*** 0.419*** 0.084*** 
 
(11.68) (3.63) (4.11) 
FV_VolDiscl_Words -0.005* 0.000** 0.000*** 
 
(-1.70) (2.47) (2.70) 
FVA1 × FV_VolDiscl_Words -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (-5.87) (-0.42) (0.47) 
FVA2 × FV_VolDiscl_Words 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.88) (-0.15) (-1.01) 
FVA3 × FV_VolDiscl_Words  0.001*** -0.001** -0.000*** 
 (4.59) (-2.55) (-3.13) 
NFVA 0.823*** 0.102** 0.012*** 




















Leverage   -0.574*** -0.438*** 
   (-13.39) (-22.26) 
Constant 3.341*** 0.526*** 0.429*** 
 
(4.11) (6.88) (18.59) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,193 2,232 2,216 




TABLE 8: Additional analyses based on changes  
 
This table presents the results of the regression used to examine how the initiation of reliability disclosures changes the market pricing and information risk 
associated with three-level fair value assets compared to firms without changes in reliability disclosures. In this analysis, the treatment firms are firms that did not 
make reliability disclosures during the early sample period, but started providing reliability disclosures later. The control firms are selected from among firms 
without reliability disclosures. Specifically, we first select firms that do not provide reliability disclosures during the sample period. Then, using the propensity 
score matching procedure, we select the same number of control firms as the treatment firms. Our final sample consists of 51 treatment firms and 51 control 
firms.  All the other variables are the changes in the variables in Equations (2) and (3). t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated below the coefficients. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 






 Baseline   OLS 
(1)      (2)  
∆Beta_adj 
 Baseline         OLS 
  (3)  (4)  
∆Correl_adj 
      Baseline         OLS 
 (5) (6) 
∆FVA1  0.068 -1.297** -7.670 -13.376 -1.753 -2.317 
 
(0.24) (-2.09) (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.51) 
∆FVA2  0.071 0.258*** -7.073 -11.692 -1.782 -2.243 
 
(1.62) (2.79) (-0.56) (-0.58) (-0.47) (-0.51) 
∆FVA3  -13.788*** -8.795*** -5.014 -10.329 -2.013 -2.534 
 
(-10.93) (-2.79) (-0.34) (-0.44) (-0.45) (-0.47) 
Treatment -3.703** -2.739*** -0.021*** -0.011 -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 
(-2.52) (-2.90) (-5.01) (-0.56) (-4.50) (-7.12) 
∆FVA1 × Treatment   1.822*** 
 
1.658   0.178 
   (3.08) 
 
(0.57)   (0.36) 
∆FVA2 × Treatment   -0.065 
 
-0.105   0.013 
   (-0.51) 
 
(-0.30)   (0.09) 
∆FVA3 × Treatment  12.790*** 7.660*** 1.558 2.530 0.662 0.767 
 (7.14) (2.64) (0.45) (0.50) (0.53) (0.52) 
∆NFVA 0.093 0.192 -7.096 -11.745 -1.743 -2.195 
 (0.97) (1.53) (-0.56) (-0.58) (-0.47) (-0.51) 
∆NFVL -0.117*** -0.266** 
 
   
 (-2.66) (-2.19) 
 
   
∆FVL -0.165 -0.187 
 
   
 (-0.33) (-0.30) 
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∆Net Income 0.553*** 0.370*** 
 




   
∆Leverage   0.822* 0.790 -0.282** -0.284* 
   (1.97) (1.42) (-2.54) (-1.81) 
Constant 2.133 6.239 0.038 0.040 0.008 0.008 
 
(1.16) (3.52) (0.61) (0.57) (0.22) (0.22) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Adjusted R-squared 0.626 0.721 0.021 0.030 -0.013 -0.033 
     
 
